Immigrant entrepreneurs often rely on their group's local social capital in their new home market to establish and maintain their businesses. In particular, immigrant entrepreneurs with few resources of their own receive help from those possessing more resources. Supporting these arguments using the empirical setting of Gujarati immigrant entrepreneurs in the lodging industry, we find that the likelihood of survival of an immigrant entrepreneur's hotel increases when surrounded by h igher counts of branded hotels (representing high-resource establishments) owned by individuals from their ethnic group but is unaffected by unbranded hotels (representing low-resource establishments) owned by members of their ethnic group or by branded hotels owned by individuals from other ethnic groups. These results isolate and reinforce the importance of social capital not only for immigrant entrepreneurs but also more generally for any entrepreneurs who are able to participate in ethnic, professional, religious or social groups. __________________ a The authors thank Paul Adler, Bob Gibbons, Anand Swaminathan and Michele Williams for thoughtful comments. We also would like to thank session participants at the American Sociological Association 2004 Annual Meeting, San Francisco. Correspondence to kalnins@usc.edu or Bridge Hall 307H, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0808. Phone: (213) 740-3582. 1 Individuals that found and operate their own ventures make up over 13% of the U.S. workforce (Hamilton, 2000) and have long been acknowledged as vital for the dynamic renewal of capitalist economies (Schumpeter, 1934; Shane and Venkatraman, 2000) . Entrepreneurs often require social resources to found these ventures (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986 ). Yet, Putnam (1995 has argued that a decrease in civic involvement by Americans has reduced the nation's stock of localized social capital.
simple agglomeration benefits that enhance performance? To distinguish benefits of social capital from those of simple agglomeration, we compare the effects of proximate high-resource ethnic group members and high-resource non-members (mostly from the native population, of the same industry) on survival of immigrant establishments that lack their own resources. We also compare the effect of proximate highresource immigrant group establishments on the survival of low-resource group member establishments with their effect on the survival of low-resource establishments owned by non-members. Only if both the contributors and recipients of benefits turn out to be members of the immigrant group would we conclude that we have identified a benefit of social capital rather than an agglomeration benefit available to all.
Our empirical setting is the lodging industry, an industry in which previous work has demonstrated benefits of agglomeration (e.g., Baum and Haveman, 1997; Chung and Kalnins, 2001 ). This industry also contains a large group of immigrant entrepreneurs: hotel owners from the Indian state of Gujarat. Gujaratis own a significant percent of hotels across the United States. In Texas in 1999, Gujaratis owned over 30% of hotels unaffiliated with national branded chains. Further, as franchisees, they owned over 50% of properties affiliated with Days Inn, Econolodge, Comfort Inn, and Super Eight and a substantial proportion of the other major branded U.S. hotel chains.
In studying Gujarati immigrant entrepreneurs, this paper follows an earlier work . That paper treated all Gujarati owners as a homogeneous group and found that Gujarati hotel owners cluster at a broad regional (multi-county) level, but not at a more local (zip code) level. The paper found no implications for pricing or revenue of a high Gujarati presence in a zip code. We build on that work by (1) analyzing establishment survival (important for capturing cost-side benefits of social capital), and by (2) analyzing the importance of resource heterogeneity within an immigrant entrepreneur community. This more detailed analysis yields important evidence of social capital not visible when treating all Gujarati owners as a homogeneous group.
IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

Literature Review
The social structure of an immigrant entrepreneur group provides motivation for a member's contribution to the social capital of the group even in the absence of direct incentives. Members may have a motivation to contribute to the group either due to a principled sense of shared values and shared destiny, or due to enforceable trust caused by an instrumental fear of reputation loss (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993) . Importantly, contributions occur among group members without reciprocity-a member may help another out financially without expecting repayment in kind.
To develop our hypotheses, we focus on the cooperative behavior that takes place among immigrant entrepreneurs, especially behavior not expecting reciprocity. In such cases, the benefits from group membership can be attributed to social capital (see Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990 for the seminal work on this topic). Synthesizing many definitions of social capital Adler and Kwon (2002: p. 23 ) state:
Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals and groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor's social relations. Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor.
The creation of greater stocks of social capital is facilitated by certain social structures. The two types of social structure that underlie immigrant entrepreneur groups are family relations and common ethnic (or regional) backgrounds. Common ethnic background also motivates immigrant entrepreneurs to help others within the ir group (e.g., Light, 1972; Bonacich and Modell, 1980) . Immigrant entrepreneurs often cluster in a particular industry in their host nation, enabling them to further cooperate and generate social capital. Scholars have identified cases of Chinese laundries in California (Ong, 1981) , Gujarati "cornershops" in Great Britain (Aldrich, Jones, and McEvoy, 1984) , as well as the Gujarati hotel owners in the United States first studied by Kalnins and Chung (2001) and analyzed further in this paper. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) discuss shared values and enforceable trust as important sources of social capital in the context of immigrant entrepreneurs. Fledgling immigrant entrepreneurs are likely to rely on the social capital of their group for support, because they may not have access to local (and typically indigenously operated) supporting institutions such as banks. As a substitute for the local supporting institutions available to native entrepreneurs, institutions such as the rotating credit association have been often raised as key outcomes of shared values and enforceable trust of immigrant entrepreneur groups (e.g., Geerz, 1962; Light, 1972) . In the rotating credit association, members are willing to loan money without any legally enforceable contract or collateral. While a member of the credit association could easily renege on future payments to others after receiving a loan, the trust is enforceable because the group members are afraid of the reputation loss they would face if they reneged. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) present other examples resulting from enforceable trust; for example loans made to Cuban and Dominican entrepreneurs by members of their ethnic community are paid back with a large certainty despite their "paperless" nature. The entrepreneur's reputation among group members is the only collateral necessary.
Our discussions with Gujarati hotel owners consistently brought out similar anecdotes of help within the immigrant entrepreneur group. We interviewed sixteen Gujarati hotel owners in Texas by telephone for 20-30 minutes each. The interviews were structured but did not contain any leading questions. For example, we simply asked "In what ways would the management of your hotel differ if you had no close contacts who owned other hotels?" All but one emphasized the role of other group members in helping them get started as well as in their continued operations. While in most cases, there were extended family or friendship ties to those that helped the most, in three cases there were none, a point that was emphasized with no prompting from us. These three owners stated that other Gujaratis who did not know them personally (there were not even mutual friendships) helped them significantly , loaning them money and providing information and supplies. One Gujarati owner of an unbranded hotel told us: 
Hypotheses
The access to social capital by immigrant entrepreneurs brings us to our "baseline" hypothesis regarding establishment survival. The benefits of social capital mentioned above, such as access to capital and information, lower the immigrant entrepreneurs' costs and thus should help the ir establishments survive. The rotating credit association, for example, lowers the immigrant entrepreneurs' cost of capital, while the donation of supplies (such as the furniture quote above) reduces their upfront fixed costs. Native entrepreneurs may have compensating access to the local infrastructure (e.g., banks), but this access typically requires some resources, implying that the immigrant entrepreneurs should have a baseline survival advantage over their native low-resource counterparts.
Hypothesis 1: Among the establishments of owners without resources, those operated by owners belonging to an immigrant entrepreneur group will have a lower probability of failure than establishments operated by non-members.
Further, we expect variation in the contributions to and the benefits from social capital made and enjoyed by group members, leading to heterogeneous survival advantages within a group. Adler and Kwon (2002) propose that motivation, opportunity, and ability to contribute to social exchange (i.e., providing a favor with no explicit quid pro quo) are necessary conditions for social capital to be generated. We expect that immigrant entrepreneurs have motivation to contribute to the social capital of their group because of shared values and enforceable trust, though some group members may have more opportunities and greater ability to contribute to social capital, that is, to help others within their group.
Opportunity to help other group members should be enhanced by geographical proximity.
Proximity has been shown to facilitate transfer of information between subsidiaries of the same firm (Adams and Jaffe, 1996) and enable face-to-face contact (McDermott and Taylor, 1982: pp. 73-74) .
Through the frequent and personal contact facilitated by proximity, group members are able to receive tacit information regarding which other members actually need help and what type of help the other members may need. With such knowledge, proximate group members will have greater opportunity to help each other versus more distant members who might also have similar motivation and ability to help, but not knowledge of the opportunity to help.
Immigrant entrepreneurs' abilit ies to contribute to social capital are enhanced by the resources they possess. Members lacking resources are less likely to be able to help others in their group even when they have the motivation and the opportunity to do so (e.g., Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993) . While group members possessing resources are less likely to help their low-resource counterparts for instrumental reasons as those lacking resources are unlikely to be to be able to reciprocate in the future, the members with resources are likely to help for reasons of principle. As established members likely feel a sense of shared values and destiny with those who have not been as successful, they are likely to help even in absence of the vaguest possibility of reciprocation.
Overall, a combination of resource abundance and geographical proximity to those who lack resources will enhance the amount of social capital that a group member can contribute. Conversely, a lack of resources combined with proximity to those possessing resources allows a firm to enjoy the benefits of social capital. If the effects of social capital sufficiently reduce costs (and in some cases, increase revenues as well) to have an impact on likelihood of establishment survival, we should observe three related results.
First, low-resource establishments of immigrant entrepreneur group members will be less likely to fail than will those of non-group members when in the vicinity of high-resource group members. While the low-resource establishments of non-members provide an important comparison for survival rates, the common ethnic or regional background is required for firms to have the ability to receive social capital benefits. Thus, this is not a generic spillover effect that would apply industry-wide to all proximate firms with few resources (e.g., Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Chung and Kalnins, 2001 ).
Second, this survival -enhancing effect of proximate high-resource group members will be greater than a beneficial effect that may arise from the presence of high-resource non-group members. While all proximate high-resource firms have the opportunity to help immigrant entrepreneurs that lack resources, only those sharing their ethnic background have the motivation to do so because of shared values and a possible gain in reputation within their community.
Third, immigrant entrepreneurs possessing roughly equal amounts of resources may be able to help each other survive, but less so than the rich can help the poor. For example, when neither proximate immigrant entrepreneur has resources, they are less likely to help each other survive since they often lack the ability. And when both entrepreneurs possess substantial resources, their common ethnicity is unlikely crucial for survival of their business establishments as their own resources are of primary importance.
These three related effects are formalized as Hypotheses 2a-2c , and are also summarized in If the presence of high-resource group members is beneficial to the group members without their own resources, as argued above, then we may observe low-resource group members acting to increase their ability to enjoy benefits of the group's social capital. Sociologists have maintained that actors attempt to gain social capital through purposeful actions (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990) . While immigrant entrepreneurs obtain in itial membership in the group merely through their ethnic origins, they can choose their level of embeddedness within the group by locating geographically in areas with many group members or in other areas with just a few. By locating in an area with many group members, an immigrant entrepreneur provides incumbent members with the opportunity to help the fledgling venture.
An alternative logic that predicts the same pattern in location choices is that of mimetic market entry. Haveman (1993) argued that market entrants followed high status firms into new markets. High-resource immigrant entrepreneur group members are likely considered to be of high status, implying that entrepreneurs would be more likely to locate in their vicinity in order to appear more similar to the high-resource group members. While a distinction between the purposeful and mimetic arguments is outside the scope of this paper, these logics suggest very similar hypotheses. And these hypotheses are analogous to those for survival presented as H2a-H2c: group members without resources will be significantly more likely to locate in the vicinity of high-resource group members than will low-resource non-group members.
Hypothesis 3a:
The probability of low-resource immigrant entrepreneur group members choosing a location with proximate high-resource member establishments will be greater than that of low-resource non-member establishments choosing such a location.
Hypothesis 3b: The probability of low-resource immigrant entrepreneur group members choosing a location with proximate high-resource member establishments will be greater than their probability of choosing a location with proximate high-resource non-member establishments.
Hypothesis 3c: The probability of low-resource immigrant entrepreneur group members choosing a location with proximate high-resource member establishments will be greater than their probability of choosing a location with other proximate low-resource member establishments.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Research Setting: Gujarati Hotels
To test the hypotheses above, we investigate an economically significant case of immigrant entrepreneurship: Gujarati hotel owners in the United States. Gujarat is a western coastal state in India whose main industry is agriculture. Yet, in the U.S., Gujaratis have mainly become hotel owners. While
Gujaratis run hotels in all fifty United States, they are particularly prevalent along the interstates of the "sun belt" that stretches from Virginia to California (Millman, 1997: p. 145 ). Concentrations of Gujarati hotels exist in Georgia, Florida, California and Texas. One Gujarati hotel owner that we interviewed estimated that "in Dallas [there are] over 400 Gujarati families out of which 95% are in the hotel business, either working for a hotel or [owning] a motel." Table 2 shows the large and growing Gujarati presence in the Texas lodging industry. As shown, Gujaratis began to acquire and found unbranded hotels in the late 1970s. They became involved in branded chains as franchisees only in the 1990s.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Millman (1997) chronicles the rise of the Gujarati owned hotels. When India was a British colony, Gujaratis wound up in England or in African colonies such as Malawi, Zambia and Uganda. Many Gujaratis were expelled from Uganda during the brutal reign of dictator Idi Amin in the 1970s, who also confiscated their businesses. Fleeing with limited savings, these Indian expatriates searched for suitable destinations. These Indian expatriates and subsequent Indian immigrants found non-luxury hotels in the US an attractive business opportunity for several reasons. First, entry barriers are low. With an investment of $40,000, the displaced could secure immigrant status in the United States. With a $40,000 investment, choice was limited to small establishments such as diners or roadside hotels. Rural hotels were often preferred because they provide both a business opportunity and a place of residence. And operating restaurants was not palatable for many Gujaratis, since as Hindus they were uncomfortable handling meat.
Contagion further increased the size of the Gujarati hotel community. Much like the format adoption of radio stations described in Greve (1995) , the Gujaratis' likelihood of entering the lodging industry was much higher than that for other entrepreneurs, due to contagion. Some additional description of the Gujarati hotel owner phenomenon can be found in Kalnins and Chung (2001) .
Gujarati hotel owners are a particularly appropriate immigrant entrepreneur group with which to test our hypotheses for two reasons. First, substantial amounts of social capital appear to be generated within the Gujarati hotel -owning community. The Gujarati hotel owners provide each other with solidarity and information, considered by Adler and Kwon (2002) to be two central benefits of social capital. Both of these benefits reduce costs and should thus increase the likelihood of establishment survival. We mentioned earlier a case of a Gujarati branded hotel owner giving away his used furniture to a Gujarati he had never met. Other similar anecdotes strengthen this point. "Everybody thinks like a family," said a Gujarati franchisee of a Red Carpet Inn in North Carolina.
1 "We try to help each other… established innkeepers can advise and support newcomers. When times are tight, they'll loan each other money." Regarding exchange of information, he adds, "The Indian immigrants will share information with each other about which banks offer the lowest rates on mortgages. They'll spread among themselves the names of customers who have stiffed them on a room bill." Gujaratis also act collectively, he notes, stating, "To save money, they'll join forces to buy televisions and other hotel equipment in bulk."
Second, Gujarati hotels largely serve the same population as their indigenously owned counterparts, allowing us to make performance comparisons and tease apart the social capital explanation from the agglomeration explanation for any performance benefits. Such comparisons would be more difficult in cases where immigrant entrepreneurs mainly serve "enclave economies," that is, customers of their own ethnic background (see, e.g., Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990; Bates, 1994; Uzzi, 1996) , or when they function as "middlemen entrepreneurs," such as the case of Korean-owned shops in low income areas (Light and Bonacich, 1988) . Relatedly, the fact that Gujaratis are not highly concentrated in narrow geographical enclaves also reduces the likelihood that Gujaratis are each other's primary competition, which can serve to undermine the benefits of the groups social capital (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990) .
Data
Our data includes all establishments operating as hotels or motels in Texas at any time between the years of 1990 and 1999 inclusive. The raw data comes from the Texas State Government
Comptroller's Office from the Hotel Tax Permit File. Every establishment that receives income from room rental must provide location and ownership data to the Texas state government. These data include a hotel's name, opening date (and closing date if applicable), street address, owner name, owner location, and size in rooms. Owner name consists of a corporation name or the name of a person. Earlier versions of this data set were used by Kalnins and Chung (2001) and by Chung and Kalnins (2001) .
The lodging industry is an ideal setting for this study because branded chain affiliation is an easily observable indicator that a firm possesses resources and has the ability to contribute to social capital. Chain-affiliated hotels will be able to attract more customers and charge premium prices because of branding (Ingram, 1996) and thus will accumulate more resources. Hotels of the branded chains also have significantly higher revenues than unbranded hotels The lodging industry also contains a clearly identifiable subset of firms that likely possess the fewest resources: hotels with the words "motel" or "motor hotel" or "motor inn" in the business name but that are not affiliated with any franchised chain. By analyzing only the subset of hotels unaffiliated with branded chains with "motel" in their name we exclude other unbranded properties such as upscale bedand-breakfasts or resort lodges.
2 Gujaratis owned 612 of 1,140 unbranded hotels in existence in Texas at the end of 1999. Our interviews confirmed that the owners of hotels unaffiliated with national chains possessed few resources. Several told us that they operated such hotels specifically because they lacked the funds to buy a larger property of the quality necessary for branded chain affiliation. The data presented in Table 2 confirm the story of evolution of Gujarati hotel ownership from unbranded hotels, in the late 1970s and 1980s when the Gujaratis first arrived in the U.S. with few resources, to branded chain hotels as franchisees in the 1990s after many Gujaratis had the opportunity to accumulate resources.
Methods
We tested Hypotheses 1 and 2a-2c using event history analysis. Specifically, we used parametric hazard models, which require that a functional form for the transition rates be specified. We estimated regressions using the exponential, Gompertz and Weibull forms, along with the Cox model that does not require the specification of form. Because our results did not differ based on the model used, we present results using the widely used exponential model. The exponential form assumes that the instantaneous transition from origin state (active establishment) to destination state (establishment-level failure) at time t does not depend on time t, but depends only on covariates. The general form of the model is:
where r is the instantaneous transition or "hazard" rate, X is a vector of covariates, and β is the vector of coefficients. Because the values of all our covariates of theoretical interest change over time, we split the life histories of all establishments into yearly spells and for each spell set all covariates to their values at the beginning of that year (see, e.g., Ingram and Baum, 1997) . The parameters were then estimated by the method of maximum likelihood.
As mentioned earlier, most of the hotels were in business before 1990, meaning that part of the sample is left-truncated-establishments that entered and exited before 1990 are not in the sample. Hypotheses 3a -3c, the determinants of location choice, are tested using the conditional logit model for discrete choice-when an actor chooses from among a set of options. The conditional logit is commonly used in studies of location choice in the fields of strategy and organization theory (e.g., Greve, 2000 , Powell et al., 2004 Shaver and Flyer, 2000) . An extensive general description can be found in Greene (1998: pp. 520-537) . In our setting, a new hotelier chooses from among geographic locations based upon attributes of the locations.
The conditional logit model is specified as follows. The alternatives j include the 578 zip codes in Texas with at least one hotel present. Each observation, therefore, has 578 rows of data. The observed dependent variable Y ij = 1 if zip code j is chosen, and Y ij = 0 for the 577 zip codes not chosen.
Assuming a linear relationship with the latent variable, we can write:
where X is a vector of independent variables of theoretical interest and control variables that are discussed in the next section. Positive values for the coefficients b imply that zip codes possessing high values of the associated variables have a higher probability of being assigned the mandate. Negative coefficients can be interpreted as lower probabilities of being chosen.
We note that, of course, each entrepreneur wishing to open a new hotel is not actively considering all 578 zip codes as location choices. The entrepreneur may only be actively considering 5 or 6 sites, but the area may be much broader. One Gujarati hotel owner that we spoke to in our interviews told us that he searched within a 60-mile radius of a major urban center, implying that many zip codes were at least summarily considered. Importantly, the results of the conditional logit model are not biased if additional alternatives are included that are not actively considered by some. Parsons and Hauber (1998) conducted a systematic study of the effects of choice set size on conditional logit coefficients, and that adding many alternatives with low likelihoods of being chosen had almost no effect.
Description of Independent Variables
Our independent variables of theoretical interest consist of a dummy variable for Gujarati hotel ownership and measures of Gujarati and non-Gujarati ownership in the vicinity of a hotel under observation. We use the owner surname to determine membership in the community of Gujarati immigrant entrepreneurs. Upon being shown a list of all surnames of hotel owners, two Gujaratis designated for us the following surnames to be Gujarati: Patel, Bhakta, Desai, Amin, Gandhi, Mistry, Thakor, Jallab, Shah, Govind, Zaveri, Rama, Rana, Mehta, Nathu, and Dalwad. Over 90% of Gujarati hotels are owned by those with the surnames Patel and Bhakta. In our data, hotel owners are often listed as corporations. To identify Gujarati corporations, we used the Texas Incorporation data file compiled by the Secretary of State and compared the list of all corporations owned by Gujaratis (based on the same surnames as above) with the corporations that owned hotels. We consider any hotel that is incorporated and has a partner with a Gujarati surname to be a Gujarati-owned hotel.
To operationalize the idea of firms with resources in the vicinity of each hotel under observation, we observe the ownership of the ten closest hotels from the latitude and longitude coordinates of the hotel's actual location for the survival analysis. For the conditional logit analysis, we observe the ownership of the ten closest hotels from each zip code's centroid, because the actual hotel had not yet been built. We include as separate variables the counts (within the closest ten) of branded-chain hotels (those likely to possess resources) and unbranded hotels (possess few resources). These counts were then separated into hotels owned by Gujaratis and those owned by others. Importantly, these counts do not include other hotels belonging to the same owner as the hotel under observation. These counts capture the presence of Gujaratis with resources in the vicinity of the hotel under observation. The counts are then interacted with the Gujarati-owned binary variable in order to assess whether only Gujaratis benefit from the proximate presence of other Gujaratis. Figure 1 illustrates how the count variable s are calculated. In the Figure, the Dunes Motel is the 10 th closest hotel to the Pinn Road Motel, the hotel under observation.
We draw a circle around the Pinn Road Motel with a radius equal to the distance to the Dunes Motel (0.7 miles). All hotels within this radius are included in one of the counts as long as they are either branded or have the word "motel" or "motor hotel" or "motor inn" in their name. The values for the count variables for the Pinn Road Motel are calculated at the bottom of Figure 1 .
[Insert Figure 1 about here] Table 3 shows us the distribution of Gujarati and non-Gujarati branded hotels in the proximity of (within the 10 closest hotels) Gujarati and non-Gujarati unbranded hotels. For example, among the 612 unbranded Gujarati hotels in existence in 1999, there were 196 with one Gujarati-owned branded hotel in their vicinity, and 209 (99 + 72 + 30 + 8) with more than one. So 65% of all unbranded Gujarati hotels in 1991 were able to enjoy some social capital from their more prosperous fellow group members.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We use the closest ten hotels rather than a fixed distance limit because the ordinal distance to a high-resource immigrant entrepreneur group member is likely more important than the actual physical distance. If a low-resource member establishment is physically close to a high-resource member, but if other needy members are even closer to that resource-rich establishment, then the given establishment is less likely to receive benefit from the group's social capital. Completely exogenous administrative areas such as counties and Metropolitan Statistical Areas vary too much in size to capture the opportunity set within which immigrant entrepreneurs can contribute to the social capital of the group. For example,
Harris County (home of Houston) had 54 unbranded Gujarati-owned hotels and 53 unbranded nonGujarati hotels in 1999, while Deaf Smith County only had four unbranded hotels, all owned by Gujaratis.
To ensure our results were not sensitive to the 10 closest hotel definition, we estimated regressions with other counts as well as zip codes. Results using alternative definitions are similar and are discussed in the robustness tests section.
Beyond these focal variables we control for the characteristics of each hotel and of its owner. We include the logged distance from the hotel to its owner's headquarters to control for absentee owner effects. We also include the room count of each hotel because larger properties have been consistently
shown to be more likely to survive (e.g., Ingram and Baum, 1997) . We also include the count of other proximate hotels of the same owner (if any) and the owner's proximate experience (calculated as in Ingram and Baum, 1997 , using a square root discount factor) at the time of the founding or acquisition of the establishment under observation (congenital experience) and a dummy variable for left truncation (whether the hotel was opened before 1990). These variables are included for the survival analysis, but not for the conditional logit. In the latter case, these variables cannot be included because they are invariant across choice locations.
To control for demographics of each hotel's vicinity, we include the mileage distance to the 10 th closest hotel (that serves as the radius for our hotel counts). Rural areas are likely to have larger distances to the 10 th closest hotel. We include zip-code residential population and per capita income (both from the 1990 census) to capture levels of potential demand. We also include the net additio n of retail establishments in the two years previous to each spell to control for economic growth. In addition, we included the count of unbranded hotel rooms in the zip code (but owned by others), as a measure of how much competition each unbranded hotel faced. These variables are included for both the exponential hazard regressions and the conditional logit regressions. Descriptive statistics and correlations for all independent variables are included in Table 4 for the exponential hazard data set (the descriptive statistics for the conditional logit data set were so similar that they are not included separately).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
RESULTS
Results of the exponential hazard model -an analysis of failure rates
The results for the exponentia l hazard analysis of failure rates are shown as Table 5 . There are four columns. The first column contains control variables only. The second column adds the "GujaratiOwned Hotel" variable to test Hypothesis 1. The third column includes four counts of proximate hotels:
Gujarati and non-Gujarati branded hotels, and Gujarati and non-Gujarati unbranded hotels. The final column adds Gujarati ownership interaction terms to test Hypotheses 2a-2c.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The results in the 2 nd through 4 th column support Hypothesis 1-membership in an immigrant entrepreneur group helps low-resource establishments. Unbranded Gujarati hotels survive substantially longer than unbranded non-Gujarati hotels, based on the significance of the very first coefficient of each column. Hypothesis 2a-the social capital of the immigrant entrepreneur groups helps low-resource group members more than it helps low-resource non-members-is supported because the coefficient of the interaction term "Gujarati Hotel x Prox. Branded Guj. Hotels" is negative and statistically significant in the 4 th column. Unbranded hotels owned by Gujaratis have a lower probability of failure, relative to unbranded non-Gujarati hotels, when proximate branded Gujarati-owned hotels are present. The failure rate comparison between the unbranded Gujarati hotels and unbranded non-Gujarati hotels is valuable because it demonstrates that the resources of branded Gujarati hotels only benefit those hotels lacking resources that are also Gujarati. This is not a spillover effect that applies to all proximate hotels, but a selective benefit from high-resource immigrant entrepreneur group members to less prosperous countrymen. Hotels owned by the same owner as that of the hotel under observation are not included in the proximate hotel counts, so our result here is not merely a multi-unit ownership effect.
Note that the primary variable "Prox. Branded Hotels owned by Gujaratis" increases the likelihood of unbranded hotel failure. The coefficient of the Gujarati interaction term is larger than that of the primary term, indicating that the net effect for Gujarati unbranded hotels is survival enhancing. While the social capital theory discussed above does not predict a harmful effect for non-group members, two possible mechanisms could be generating the higher failure rates for non-Gujarati unbranded hotels in the vicinity of Gujarati branded hotels. First, the "Red Queen effect" has been shown to operate at the level of groups of organizations (Ingram and Simons, 2002) . In other words, the cooperation between group member organizations indirectly hurts non-member organizations because the latter become relatively less competitive. Second, as discussed earlier, Gujarati chain hotels are more likely to belong to low-tier chains, and have the lowest prices, even within those chains. These findings suggest that the quality of unbranded motels in the vicinity of Gujarati chain hotels may be low, and that such hotels might be the most prone to failure. The social capital of the Guja rati group can help those unbranded establishments overcome the higher likelihood of failure faced by other unbranded hotels.
Hypothesis 2b and 2c-that low-resource group members benefit more from high-resource group members than from high-resource non-members or from low-resource non-members-require comparisons between the interaction effect of "Gujarati Hotel x Proximate Branded Gujarati-Owned Hotels" versus "Gujarati Hotel x Proximate Branded Non-Gujarati Hotels" and versus "Gujarati Hotel x
Proximate Unbranded Gujarati-Owned Hotels". Table 6 displays the chi-square tests of size differences of these coefficients from Table 5 .
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Hypothesis 2b is supported, as demonstrated by the statistical significance of the first chi-square test in Table 6 . The coefficient of the "Gujarati Hotel x Prox. Branded Gujarati Hotels" interaction term variable in Table 5 is significantly larger than that of the "Gujarati Hotel x Prox. Branded non-Gujarati Hotels" interaction term. This statistically significant greater effect demonstrates that the reduction in failure rates to unbranded Gujarati hotels, relative to unbranded non-Gujarati hotels, is not caused by the presence of just any branded chain hotel. The branded hotels must be owned by Gujaratis.
H2c is also supported. The coefficient of the "Gujarati Hotel x Prox. Branded Gujarati Hotels" interaction term variable is significantly larger than that of the "Gujarati Hotel x Prox. Unbranded
Gujarati Hotels" interaction term, as demonstrated by the significance of the second chi-squared test in Table 6 . The proximate presence of branded Gujarati Hotels is far more beneficial to the unbranded Gujarati hotel owner than is the presence of other unbranded Gujarati hotels in his or her vicinity. This finding supports the idea that resources are required for an immigrant entrepreneur to have the ability to contribute to the group's social capital and to help other group members. The proximate presence of unbranded Gujarati hotels does not significantly increase or decrease the likelihood of failure of other unbranded Gujarati hotels, relative to their effect on unbranded non-Gujarati hotels.
Among the control variables, larger hotels are more likely to survive longer, as are hotels whose headquarters are more proximate. This interesting result indicates a cost to absentee ownership. Hotels will also survive longer in areas with high levels of retail growth.
To summarize, the combination of support for H2a-H2c strongly suggests that immigrant entrepreneur group members without resources only benefit from the presence of group members with resources. By separating group members from proximate non-group members, we isolated empirically a social capital based group effect from any general agglomeration or spillover effect that would arise from presence of branded chain hotels owned by anyone, or simply in more profitable or high-growth areas.
Results of the conditional logit model-an analysis of location choice
Hypotheses 3a-3c, which predicted that low-resource member establishments will locate close to high-resource member establishments but not to high-resource non-members or low-resource members, are tested in Table 7 using a conditional logit model of location choice. While the hypotheses are not supported, interesting results emerge. In particular, the coefficient of the "Gujarati Hotel x Prox.
Unbranded Gujarati Hotels" is positive and significant, which suggests that the presence of unbranded Gujarati hotels increases a location's attractiveness to Gujarati entrepreneurs. Given the strong support for H2a-H2c, which predicted that low-resource member firms benefit more from the presence of highresource members than from other establishment types, this opposite result to H3c's expectation is intriguing. We discuss implications below.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Among the control variables in the conditional logit regressions, we find that owners locate in the vicinity of their existing hotels (if they have any). More interesting is the fact that they are more likely to locate in low income areas and areas where the logged distance to the 10 th closest hotel is greater, which is the case in more rural areas. These findings suggest that the unbranded hotel retains a niche in these markets typically overlooked by the large branded chains.
Robustness Tests
Before settling on our main results, we conducted several alternate tests. While presenting results using the closest 10 hotels as the relevant vicinity for the hotel under observation, we also varied the count downwards to the closest 5 hotels and upwards to the closest 15, 20, 30, and 40 hotels, and also used the counts in each hotel's zip code. The survival results (H1, H2a-2c) presented hold for the range between 5 and 15 hotels, and marginal significance remained when using zip code. The stability of results in the 5 to 15 range suggests that the closest 20, 30 or 40 is too broad a range. While the distance to the 30 th closest hotel may not be too far for high-resource owners to have the opportunity to understand the needs of other owners within their ethnic community, there are likely to be other needy establishments closer to the high-resource owner that will receive the benefits. The conditional logit results that Gujaratis are attracted to locations with other unbranded Gujarati hotels are also robust between the range of 5 and 20 hotels, as well as to the case of zip codes.
In addition, we split the Texan hotel population into metro and rural subsamples (we defined metro areas as Texas' ten most populous counties, which contain the state's major cities). We found that H2a-H2c hold for the metro subsample , and H2a and H2b hold for the rural subsample. H2c is very close to significant for the latter subsample (p < 0.113). We find particularly interesting the fact that the social capital of the immigrant group remains important in metro areas where the individual entrepreneurs should have more opportunity to obtain resources from the native population.
DISCUSSION
Contribution to the literature
Our study provides interesting findings regarding heterogeneity of contribution and benefits within groups of immigrant entrepreneurs. Both opportunity and ability enhance a group member's contributions to and benefits from the group's social capital. Members of the group that possess more resources are less likely to be helped by others in the group, because the others are unlikely to possess resources that the high-resource group members would find valuable. In this sense, our findings are very consistent with those of other research streams on other types of interaction between firms where resource heterogeneity has been explicitly considered. Ahuja (2000) and Shaver and Flyer (2000) , for example, find that firms with their own resources are less likely to seek alliances and agglomeration opportunities, respectively. In those cases, similar to ours, firms with few resources benefit most from cooperation while those with abundant resources contribute the most. The result also complements sociological work on entrepreneurship that has found performance benefits for entrepreneurs able to affiliate with high-status venture capitalists (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999 ). Yet, unlike those instances, the immigrant entrepreneurs are well aware of their contributions to others in their group, and do not appear to try to avoid such contribution (as do the firms in Ahuja, 2000 and Shaver and Flyer, 2000) nor do they charge a premium as do the high-status VC's (Hsu, 2004) . In fact, based on the our interviews, established highresource Gujarati hotel owners were proud of being able to contribute without any compensation, consistent with the ideas of shared values and shared destiny.
Our results presented here for one large group of immigrant entrepreneurs complements work about performance heterogeneity within the large industrial business groups such as chaebols and keiretsus (e.g., Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian, 1996) as well as Israeli kibbutzim (Ingram and Simons, 2002) . Indeed, the results here broaden the scope of applicability for that literature. Like our group of immigrant entrepreneurs, industrial business groups often revolve around family and ethnic ties (Granovetter, 1994) . Unlike the small-enterprise level of the Gujaratis, large industrial business groups include the cross-holding of equity and substantial employment of workers from outside the group. Yet, the basic principle underlying our hypotheses-that ability and opportunity matter for contributions to and benefits from social capital-should hold for any group bound by norms other than an incentive to maximize individual profits.
Given the benefits for a Gujarati unbranded hotel to be in the vicinity of a branded Gujarati hotel, the result that Gujarati entrepreneurs are likely to locate their unbranded hotels primarily in the vicinity of other unbranded Gujarati hotels is surprising. This result suggests that the location is not chosen to increase potential personal benefits via proximate high-resource group members. It also suggests that the location choice is not made merely to enjoy the social benefits of many proximate group members because these benefits should arise from locating proximately to any type of Gujarati establishment, highor low-resource. Finally, the result reduces the possibility that these foundings are spin-offs from existing firms (e.g., Klepper and Sleeper, 2000) that locate proximately to the entrepreneur's previous employer (Sorenson and Audia, 2000) . While some Gujaratis do "spin-off" by first working for the hotel of another Gujarati, the employing hotel is typically a branded property that requires additional staff. The unbranded hotels are often literal "mom and pop" operations that only require one or two additional part-time staff (Kalnins and Chung, 2001, p: 34) . Of the sixteen Gujarati hotel owners that we interviewed, only three had previously worked for branded chain hotels.
Why then should Gujaratis locate their unbranded hotels proximate to other unbranded Gujarati hotels? Baum, Li and Usher (2000) found that firms were more likely to imitate similar others than large, visible firms in spatial location decisions. Our findings suggest that the Gujarati entrepreneurs, too, are locating mimetically in the vicinity of the most socially similar others-other unbranded Gujarati hotels.
Alternatively, the cost of locating in an area with branded properties may be prohibitive for entrepreneurs seeking to found an unbranded hotel. And we note that our split of Gujarati hotels into high-and lowresource subgroups clarifies some insignificant results presented by Kalnins and Chung (2001) . In that study, the Gujaratis were not split into the two groups and no localized clustering was found to occur.
Our results regarding geographical proximity also complement the large and growing literature of social networks (see, e.g., Burt, 2000 , for an extensive review). For example, Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) highlighted the benefits of family members to entrepreneurs, while Ingram and Roberts (2000) demonstrated the importance of friendship ties for hotel management. The arguments presented here are similar to the network literature's arguments that individuals within a network benefit heterogeneously based on their network position. Much like geographical proximity, a network tie provides an opportunity to help fellow group members. We believe that immigrant entrepreneur groups would be an interesting setting for a more thorough study of friendship ties. Based on our interview data, it is clear that groups such as the Gujaratis have networks of family and friends within the industry that can contribute to social capital even when outside their geographical vicinity.
Caveats
Before concluding, we note two caveats. First, while our results are consistent with the first hypothesis, the business establishments of immigrant entrepreneur group members may survive longer than their indigenously owned counterparts for reasons not directly resulting from membership in the immigrant group. Immigrant group members often possess higher levels of human capital (such as education) than their competition because they may not have the wide range of opportunities that educated locals possess (Light and Bonacich, 1988; Sanders and Nee, 1996) . We do not discount this explanation. In fact, we believe that it complements our explanations of success based on social capital.
We do note, however, that human capital explanations do not exist for our Hypotheses 2a -2c: enhanced survival in the vicinity of other group members cannot be explained without explicit group effects.
Second, while the results presented in this paper provide systematic statistical evidence regarding the economic importance of social capital within groups of immigrant entrepreneurs, the results here are limited to one U.S. state, one ethnic group, and one industry. Nevertheless, Texas is a large state with a wide variety of location types (e.g., urban, rural, major highways, and coastal resorts) that appear representative of those existing throughout the United States. Further, our interviews with Gujaratis indicated that their behavior conforms to that expected by social capital theory, also suggesting generalizability. While the hotel industry has some idiosyncrasies (low entry costs, ability to operate independently or as a part of a franchised branded chain), it is likely these structural features that have allowed a group of immigrant entrepreneurs to flourish and even dominate the industry. As the Gujaratis have accumulated resources they have remained in the industry, but from the more profitable and powerful vantage of the franchised branded chains.
CONCLUSION
Groups within a capitalist economy that can develop and maintain local social capital have been suggested as a vital source of entrepreneurial talent, even in developed nations (Putnam, 1995; . We assessed the importance of a group of immigrant entrepreneurs within the lodging industry, arguing that group membership provides critical resources for struggling members, thereby improving likelihood of establishment survival , relative to that enjoyed by non-members. While controlling for agglomerationbased benefits that do not require group membership to accrue, we developed and tested hypotheses that survival benefits enjoyed by group members are the result of social capital. Some firms may contribute to and benefit from the group's social capital differently due to differences in their ability and opportunity.
Greater stocks of social capital enable firms to initiate social exchange. Firms with few resources are unlikely to be able to help their fellow group members even if they had the motivation and opportunity.
Also geographical proximity is important for the opportunity to conduct social exchanges. Consistent with these arguments, we found that proximate group member firms with resources increased the likelihood of survival of other group member firms in their vicinity significantly more than the proximate presence of high-resource non-group members. These results reinforce the importance of social capital not only for immigrant entrepreneurs but also more generally for any entrepreneurs that have the ability of participating in ethnic, professional, religious or social groups. (4) Non-branded hotels include only those with the words "motel" or "motor hotel" or "motor inn" in their name. Two-tailed tests: + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Variables 1, 11, and 14 could not be included because they do no differ within the set of alternatives for each owner. Variable 10 is not included because it is often endogenous to the choice of location.
